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NOTE: MODERNIZING CONSERVATIONISM:
RENEWABLE ENERGY’S SPECIESPRESERVING EFFECT AND THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
CHASE HAMILTON*
ABSTRACT
Environmental policymakers face a dilemma, for the construction
and operation of renewable energy facilities mitigates ecologically
destructive climate change in the long term but often adversely affects
species in the short term. This paper provides empirical, legal, and
normative resources for analyzing what I call “species clash.” In most
cases, renewable energy is much more helpful than harmful when it
comes to preventing species extinctions, but the Endangered Species Act
paradoxically poses a barrier to such species-preserving projects.
Framing the benefits of renewable energy in terms of species
conservation may not only help secure speedy and cost-efficient
compliance with the Act, but also foster a more rational conservationism
fit for an era of climate change.
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INTRODUCTION
What if future ecologists look back and find that the deadliest
animal in the history of the world was not an apex predator, like the
wolf or lion, but the innocent, unhurried, and herbivorous Mojave
desert tortoise? In 2011, the construction and operation of the world’s
largest solar thermal plant1 came to a screeching halt for over three
months as experts vigorously debated how to build in the Mojave
desert without displacing more than thirty-eight of the charming
reptiles in accordance with a permit granted under the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”).2 To comply with the law protecting the
endangered tortoise, the final Ivanpah solar energy project was
delayed and then scaled back by 12%.3 Renewable energy projects like
Ivanpah are crucial for replacing fossil fuel energy sources that will
cause ecologically-destructive climate change.4 On plausible
assumptions, scientific models can be extended to estimate that the

Copyright © 2021 Chase Hamilton.
* I thank and credit Professor Michael Livermore for the idea that motivated this Note. See
Michael A. Livermore, Climate Change and Endangered Species (lecture at Duke University
School of Law, Oct. 16, 2019) (presentation on file with author). I received helpful comments
from many, including Professors Michael Livermore, Rebecca Rich, and Jonathan Wiener. I also
thank the many people who make it possible to dedicate one’s time to writing a law review article.
All errors are my own.
1. Katherine Tweed, World’s Largest Solar Thermal Plant Syncs to the Grid, IEEE
SPECTRUM (Sept. 26, 2013, 3:06 PM),
https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/renewables/worlds-largest-solar-thermal-plantsyncs-to-the-grid. Solar thermal plants use mirrors or lenses to concentrate sunlight and convert
it into electricity. Ivanpah remains the second largest such facility; in 2018 it was eclipsed by the
Noor/Ouarzazate Solar Power Station in Morocco.
2. The Ivanpah solar facility was granted an Incidental Take Permit (ITP) under the ESA
for up to thirty-eight tortoises. See infra Section II for a discussion of ITPs. After an
environmental review of the project, the Fish and Wildlife Service found this was likely an
underestimate, with about eighty tortoises likely to be affected. CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN
THE CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND BRIGHTSOURCE ENERGY, INC. REGARDING THE
IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC GENERATING SYSTEM PROJECT IN THE MOJAVE DESERT 3 (2011).
3. Todd Woody, BrightSource Alters Solar Plant Plan to Address Concerns Over Desert
Tortoise,
N.Y.
TIMES
GREEN
BLOG
(Feb.
2,
2011,
12:20
PM),
https://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/11/brightsource-alters-solar-plant-plan-to-addressconcerns-over-desert-tortoise/.
4. See generally infra Section I.
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delays and downsizing of the Ivanpah solar energy project to protect
the desert tortoise will cause the extinction of more than 350 species
due to environmental destruction from climate change.5 It is hard to
imagine any other animal capable of killing so many species.6
Of course, the real culprits here are not the tortoises but climate
change and its contributors—us. It is widely accepted that the United
States, along with the rest of the world, must shift away from fossil fuel
energy sources to prevent or mitigate considerable global harms from
greenhouse-gas-caused climate change.7 The Biden administration is
pushing for the U.S. to become carbon-neutral by 20358 and this shift
will require the rapid development of renewable, low-carbon energy
sources.9 However, such projects must be built and operated in
compliance with the well-intentioned ESA, which prohibits harming
listed species.10 The ESA helpfully prevents the wanton destruction of
endangered species, but it also poses barriers to renewable energy
projects that would help keep species from becoming endangered and
going extinct due to climate change.
Discussion of the ESA and renewable energy projects reveals a socalled “green clash” between two environmentally-friendly objectives:
5. Under the original 440 megawatt (MW) solar facility plan the three-month delay
represents a 110 MW loss; further, the cutback to a 392 MW facility returns 48 MW less for each
year of the facility’s anticipated 50-year lifespan. Woody, supra note 3. Using well-regarded
methods, climate science can estimate that every additional 7 MW coal installed to meet those
energy demands can be expected to result in the extinction of a species due to climate change. See
infra Section I. Estimating Renewable Energy’s Species-Preserving Effect. (110 MW + 48 MW *
50 years) / 7 MW per species extinct = 358.57 species extinct.
6. Contending with the tortoise for Most Dangerous Animal is the domestic cat, which kills
more than 12 billion birds, reptiles, and rodents a year. Scott Loss et al., The Impact of FreeRanging Domestic Cats on Wildlife of the United States, 4 NATURE COMM. 1396 (2013),
https://doi.org/10.1038/ncomms2380. Even with these numbers, the cat is known to have
contributed to the extinction of only 33 species, about seven percent of what we can expect the
tortoise to have caused in the Ivanpah incident alone. See Nogales et al., Feral Cats and
Biodiversity Conservation: The Urgent Prioritization of Island Management, 63 BIOSCIENCE 804,
805 (2013) (detailing cat-related extinctions).
7. See generally infra Section I.
8. WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: PRESIDENT BIDEN SETS 2030 GREENHOUSE GAS
POLLUTION REDUCTION TARGET AIMED AT CREATING GOOD-PAYING UNION JOBS AND
SECURING
U.S.
LEADERSHIP
ON
CLEAN
ENERGY
TECHNOLOGIES
(2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-presidentbiden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-payingunion-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/.
9. U.S. Can Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions 80 Percent by 2050, Study Says, YALE ENV’T
360
(Nov.
21,
2014),
https://e360.yale.edu/digest/us_can_cut_greenhouse_gas_emissions_80_percent_by_2050_study_
says.
10. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2018).
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protecting endangered species and protecting the world from climate
change.11 The exact reason the clash is “green,” however, is usually
assumed or only vaguely described, resulting in a mismatch of “green”
goals. The ESA is “green” because it aims to protect endangered
species.12 Renewable energy is “green” because it helps protect the
world from climate change, and most legal scholars fixate on the harms
of climate change to humanity, not animals.13 Therefore the clash
between the ESA and renewable energy is typically assumed to involve
a tradeoff between human and animal interests, and the ESA almost
never permits the sacrifice of endangered species for humanity’s sake.14
But climate change threatens all of us, including animal species.15 To
move beyond the vaguely “green” ethos of renewable energy, both the
ESA and renewable energy should be framed in terms of species
preservation—a “species clash.” This framing makes renewable energy
and species conservation commensurable and is therefore the most
promising route to facilitating ESA compliance using “green”
justifications.16 But it can also be normatively disorienting for
environmentalists who must now choose between two outcomes that
will each result in the loss of something they value.17
This paper makes empirical, legal, and normative arguments. The
empirical claim, made in Section I for the first time with detail in legal
literature, is that renewable energy projects have a “species-preserving
effect”—projects that harm some members of endangered species in
the short term will nevertheless save many more entire species from
future extinction driven by climate change.18 The legal argument, made
11. See Blair Warner, Overhauling ESA Private Land Provisions in Light of the Renewable
Energy Boom on Federal Public Lands, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1875, 1884 (2014) (describing
the competing policy goals of endangered species protection and renewable energy development
as a “green clash”).
12. See infra Section Giving Renewable Energy a Pass Through the ESA (describing the
ESA’s purpose).
13. See, e.g., Daniel Bertsch, When Good Intentions Collide: Seeking a Solution to Disputes
Between Alternative Energy Development and the Endangered Species Act, 14 SUSTAINABLE DEV.
L.J. 74 (2011) (arguing that renewable energy is good for a variety of reasons, including fighting
climate change, but not mentioning the benefits to animal species from such efforts).
14. See generally infra Section II.
15. See generally infra Section I.
16. See generally infra Section III.
17. See generally infra Section IV.
18. Legal scholars have not attempted this task in detail. See, e.g., Kalyani Robbins, The
Biodiversity Paradigm Shift: Adapting the Endangered Species Act to Climate Change, 27
FORDHAM ENV’T REV. 57, 63–73 (2015) (discussing various mechanisms of ecological destruction
via climate change, but not attempting to quantify them in terms of the relative costs and benefits
of renewable energy projects); J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the
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in Sections II and III, is that the ESA currently acts as a substantial
barrier to beneficial renewable energy development (Section II), but
there is room under the statute to lessen that barrier in ways that do
not simultaneously apply to oil, gas, and coal projects that produce
more GHGs than they save (Section III).19 The normative argument,
made in Section IV and relatively unexplored in the literature, is that
it is preferable to save as many species as possible from climate changedriven extinctions, even where it requires knowingly interfering with
an endangered species today.20
In whole, this paper aims to provide resources for analyzing the
tension between renewable energy and endangered species. “Species
clash” is an example of a risk-risk tradeoff.21 Policymakers tend to focus
on singular target risks22—for example, the ESA agencies tend to focus
on the present risk to listed species. But the real world is multi-risk, so
reducing a target risk may incur countervailing risks or yield cobenefits.23 Policymakers should confront the multiple risks and
potential tradeoffs, weigh them, and select the policy option that will
reduce overall risk.24 Acting under the ESA to reduce the target risk of

Endangered Species Act Through Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1789 (2012)
(assuming for the sake of argument that the overall species-preserving effect of renewable energy,
which he calls the “wind power effect,” is positive but suggesting it is impossible to conclusively
support this claim).
19. Note that my claim is just that species-saving projects can bypass some hurdles set by
the ESA—not that the ESA can be used proactively as a general ecosystem management statute.
For criticism of the broader approach, see Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1792 (arguing that the ESA has
an “emergency room” posture that makes it inappropriate for general ecosystem management).
20. The normative dimension of a species clash is largely neglected in ESA scholarship. Four
authors mention the issue, each arriving at different conclusions. See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1793
(suggesting that neither the ESA nor the ethics of intergenerational policy choices are wellequipped for handling a species clash); John Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 59, 88–92 (2013) (suggesting that a pass for renewables under
the ESA would be bad for policy reasons); Robbins, supra note 18, at 103 (2015) (suggesting that
we must be willing consider species trade-offs as a result of anthropogenic changes in the
environment); Gregg Badichek, Resolving Conflicts Between Endangered Species Conservation
and Renewable Energy Siting: Wiggle Room for Renewables?, 14 CONSILIENCE 1, 2 (2016)
(explicitly assuming without argument that we should be willing to sacrifice some species for the
sake of many). Other authors who discuss the ESA and species clash focus on human interests.
See, e.g., Rachael Salcido, Rationing Environmental Law in a Time of Climate Change, 46 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 617, 643–44 (2015) (arguing the need for human survival makes it necessary to
sacrifice endangered species for renewable energy development).
21. See JOHN D. GRAHAM AND JONATHAN B. WIENER, RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1995) (discussing risk-risk tradeoffs in detail).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. See also Jonathan B. Wiener, Learning to Manage the Multirisk World, 40 RISK
ANALYSIS 2137 (2020) (offering guidance on moving from single to multiple risks in analysis,
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one species loss due to renewable energy projects may incur the
countervailing risk of future species loss due to the added climate
change from forestalling the renewable projects and extending the use
of fossil fuels.25 Environmental policymakers have a responsibility to
carefully consider all of an action’s foreseeable consequences, not just
the ones that are most obvious or intuitive.
Beyond the details, the broader point is that the effects of climate
change are so magnitudinous that the benefits of mitigation efforts will
often exceed the costs, even where those costs are immediate or
otherwise bear on our consciences. The two spiritual goals of this paper
are therefore to motivate efforts to effectively fight climate change and
develop a more sensible and less self-defeating approach to
conservation policy.
I.

ESTIMATING RENEWABLE ENERGY’S SPECIESPRESERVING EFFECT

Greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions are the principal source of
anthropogenic climate change.26 Fossil fuel combustion for energy is
responsible for 75% of total anthropogenic U.S. GHG emissions,27 so
the most promising route to fighting climate change is the development
of renewable energy.28 Unfortunately, utility-scale renewable energy
facilities can harm endangered species and adversely modify their
habitats.29 This section considers the factual clash between renewable
energy and endangered species, concluding that the effect of renewable
energy on non-human species is overwhelmingly positive, even
considering the incidental harms to species from renewable energy
project development.
There are unfortunate, but well-understood, conflicts between
renewable energy development and endangered species. Together,
renewable energy makes up about 20% of energy generated in the

management, impacts, and decisions).
25. See infra Section I.
26. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENV’T PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions (last updated Sept. 13,
2019).
27. Energy and the Environment Explained, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/energy-and-the-environment/where-greenhouse-gasescome-from.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2021).
28. Id.
29. For a discussion of the impacts of distributed energy rather than utility-scale facilities,
see generally J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Distributed Energy and the Endangered Species Act, 4 SAN
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 121 (2013).
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United States.30 Hydropower dams, the oldest and most heavily used
source of renewable energy, represent about 20% of the world’s total
power generation31 and approximately 7% of that in the United
States.32 Unfortunately, endangered fish and marine mammals have no
way to migrate around dams and are frequently killed in the turbines.33
Mitigation efforts have proven ineffective;34 still, there is an urgent
need to expand hydropower capacity.35 For solar power, deserts are the
sunniest, best places for facilities but are also sensitive ecosystems.36
Solar power facility construction and operation risk the lives of
endangered species like tortoises and interfere with their habitats.37
Meanwhile, the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) estimates that wind
turbines kill 440,000 birds annually,38 including a number of
endangered bats.39 Unfortunately, the best areas for wind farms also
tend to be the areas in which birds fly—as one FWS official pointed
out, “basically you can overlay the strongest, best areas for wind
turbine development with the [endangered] whooping crane
migrations corridor.”40
Despite its vices, renewable energy has the crucial virtue of
reducing deadly GHG emissions in contrast to oil, gas, and coal. GHG30. What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last updated Mar. 5, 2021).
31. Anne-Marie Corley, The Future of Hydropower, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 1, 2010, 5:07
PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/energy/renewables/future-of-hydropower.
32. Hydropower
Explained,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/hydropower.cfm (last updated Mar. 30, 2020).
33. Kalyani Robbins, Responsible, Renewable, and Redesigned: How the Renewable Energy
Movement Can Make Peace with the Endangered Species Act, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 555, 565
(2014).
34. Id.
35. INTERNATIONAL HYDROPOWER ASSOCIATION, 2020 HYDROPOWER STATUS REPORT
12 (2020) (noting that, in order to limit global temperature rise, “global hydropower capacity
would need to increase by 25 percent by 2030, and by 60 percent by 2050”).
36. See Matthew Mason, Deserts as Ecosystems, ENVIRONMENTALSCIENCE.ORG,
https://www.environmentalscience.org/deserts-ecosystems (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (reviewing
the usefulness of deserts for understanding climate change because of their sensitivity).
37. See infra Section II (discussing the Ivanpah facility and the desert tortoise).
38. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., FINAL PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT ON WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON BLM-ADMINISTERED LANDS IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES 59–60 (2005).
39. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., INDIANA BAT (MYOTIS SODALIS), ENDANGERED
SPECIES, http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/mammals/inba/inbafctsht.html (last updated
Aug. 5, 2019); Brian Handwerk, Wind Turbines Give Bats the “Bends,” Study Finds, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2008), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/08/080825batbends.html.
40. ROBERT RIGHTER, WINDFALL: WIND ENERGY IN AMERICA TODAY 108 (2011)
(quoting Tohm Stehn, FWS whooping crane coordinator).
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caused climate change is the single greatest cause of species
extinctions—it causes oceans to deoxygenate41 and acidify,42 ice to
melt,43 seasons to change,44 and a variety of other cascading effects that
displace, disrupt, and threaten ecosystems.45 Already, one species of
mammal is known to have been driven extinct due to climate change,46
and many more extinctions loom imminently.47 Further, extinctions
will dramatically accelerate as ecosystems lose crucial links that
preserve longstanding, delicate balances.48 Because renewable energy
must expand dramatically in order to combat this trend,49 and because
it has both positive and negative effects, renewable energy’s benefits
and costs to species should be compared.
One scholar suggests that it is impossible to conclusively
determine whether renewable energy helps or hurts species.50
41. Craig Welch, Oceans Are Losing Oxygen-and Becoming More Hostile to Life, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/03/150313-oceansmarine-life-climatechange-acidification-oxygen-fish/.
42. Cheryl Logan, A Review of Ocean Acidification and America’s Response, 60
BIOSCIENCE 819 (2010).
43. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, SYNTHESIS & ASSESSMENT PRODUCT 4.2:
THRESHOLDS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN ECOSYSTEMS 2 (2009).
44. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS
IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (Thomas Karl et al. eds., 2009).
45. See, e.g., Hinzman et al., Evidence and Implications of Recent Climate Change in
Northern Alaska and Other Arctic Regions, 72 CLIMATIC CHANGE 251, 251 (2005).
46. The Bramble Cay melomys, a rodent that lived on a Great Barrier Reef island, was
declared extinct in 2016 due to rising sea levels. Barrier Reef Rodent is First Mammal Declared
Extinct due to Climate Change, UNIV. OF QUEENSL. NEWS (June 14, 2016),
https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2016/06/barrier-reef-rodent-first-mammal-declared-extinctdue-climate-change.
47. See Ed Yong, The Bleak Future of Australian Wildlife, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/01/australias-fires-have-been-devastating-forwildlife/604837/ (describing numerous species on the brink of extinction due to climate change);
John McLaughlin et al., Climate Change Hastens Population Extinctions, 99 PROC. NAT’L ACAD.
SCI. U.S. 6070 (2002) (examining losses in two butterfly species and predicting extinctions driven
by climate change).
48. Gerardo Ceballos et al., Vertebrates on the Brink as Indicators of Biological Annihilation
and the Sixth Mass Extinction, 117 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13596, 13596 (2020) (“[S]pecies
are links in ecosystems, and, as they fall out, the species they interact with are likely to go also.”).
49. Simon Evans, ‘Exceptional new normal’: IEA raises growth forecast for wind and solar
by another 25%, CARBONBRIEF (May 11, 2021), https://www.carbonbrief.org/exceptional-newnormal-iea-raises-growth-forecast-for-wind-and-solar-by-another-25.
50. See J.B. Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1789 (“First, it would be necessary for the FWS to
quantify the impact of installed [renewable] power capacity on climate change. . . . Second, it
would be necessary for the FWS to be able to evaluate the impacts of [reducing climate change]
on wildlife and habitat in general . . . [a]nd from there, it would be necessary for the FWS to be
able to conclude that the net impact [] on species balanced against the overall harms to species
posed by [renewable] power infrastructure comes out on the positive side for species overall. . . .
[It would be] preposterous [] to suggest that under current climate and species modeling capacity
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However, some back-of-the-napkin math drawn from climate models
reveals that the benefits dramatically exceed the costs. While it is
impossible to be exact, we can use a number of simplifying assumptions
to get a very rough—but illustrative—estimate of what I call the
“species-preserving effect” of renewable energy. Confidence in the
particular numbers should be low because large-scale projections into
the future involve a tremendous amount of uncertainty, but using the
best data available at present produces such striking findings that we
can be confident that the overall species-preserving effect of renewable
energy is overwhelmingly positive.
To start, we can estimate the number of species that will go extinct
due to climate change in various scenarios. One authoritative study
found that, for currently-predicted climate-warming scenarios for 2050,
15–37% of species will be “committed to extinction.”51 This figure is
based on the carbon dioxide already released into the atmosphere as
well as low, medium, and high-range estimates of carbon projected to
be released. Once carbon is released, it is virtually impossible to
remove it from the atmosphere—its future effect on global warming is
locked in.52 Since species will be driven extinct by rising temperatures
and the corresponding ecological changes, we can use this data to
predict about how many species will inevitably be killed due to carbon
emitted up to 2050.53 Because there are approximately 8.7 million
species on Earth,54 we can estimate that even low-end warming
scenarios will result in approximately 1.3 million species extinctions.55
the FWS or any other entity could conclusively support such a finding[.]”).
51. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427 NATURE 145, 145 (2004). I
describe this study as “authoritative” because it has nineteen expert authors, is widely cited with
approval, and is published in the world’s most respected scientific journal. See Clarivate Analytics,
“Nature,” 2018 Journal Impact Factor, J. CITATION REPS. (2020) (noting that Nature was the
world’s most cited scientific journal in 2018 and has an impact rating ranking above the 99th
percentile for all academic journals). The study has also been able to withstand various criticisms.
See Thomas et al., Uncertainty in Predictions of Extinction Risk/Effects of Changes in Climate and
Land Use/Climate Change and Extinction Risk (reply), 430 NATURE 34, 35 (2004) (concluding
that further investigation “is unlikely to result in substantially reduced estimates of extinction”).
52. This figure incorporates the most likely mitigation efforts in its overall calculation,
lending further support to the idea of the carbon as being locked in. Id.
53. It is worth noting that many of the extinctions will not occur until after 2050—to say that
species will be “committed to extinction” is to say that the carbon emissions up to 2050 will set
into motion a chain of events that will inevitably cause these extinctions. UN Report: Nature’s
Dangerous Decline ‘Unprecedented’; Species Extinction Rates ‘Accelerating,’ UNITED NATIONS
(May 6, 2019), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-declineunprecedented-report/.
54. Mora et al., How Many Species Are There on Earth and in the Ocean?, 9 PLOS BIOLOGY
1, 2 (2011).
55. 8.7 million species * 15% extinct = 1.305 million species extinctions. This result is not far
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From these numbers, we can roughly calculate the impact of each
unit of energy produced by fossil fuels instead of renewable energy.
The low-end climate scenario used in the above calculations used a
maximum mean increase in global temperature of 1.7°C. Since a 1.7°C
increase in temperature amounts to about 1.3 million extinctions, we
will see on the margin approximately one species extinction for every
.0000013°C increase in global temperature. The EPA estimates that for
every 1,500 megawatts (“MW”) of electric generating units (“EGU”)
from a typical coal-fired power plant, we can expect a .00028°C global
temperature increase.56 Thus, for every 1,500 MW of EGU using coal,
we can expect about 215 species extinctions in the future.57 If that is
true, then approximately every 7 MW of coal installed to meet energy
demands can be expected to cause, over its lifetime and on the margin,
one species extinction.58
This result is itself revealing—the operation of a typical coal plant
over its lifetime commits hundreds of species to extinction.59 Turning
back to renewable energy, the analysis up to now suggests that every 7
MW of energy that could have been provided by renewable energy but
is instead provided by coal amounts to one species extinction in the
future due to climate change. For perspective, the U.S.’s three main
sources of renewable energy currently produce megawatts exceeding
39,400 times 7.60 In other words, assuming renewable energy displaces
from the UN’s own prediction that human activity is conservatively projected to cause over one
million species extinctions. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL SCIENCE-POLICY PLATFORM ON
BIODIVERSITY & ECOSYSTEM SERVICES, GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 11–12 (2019).
56. Letter from Robert Meyers, Principal Deputy Assistant Adm’r, Office of Air &
Radiation, EPA, to H. Dale Hall, Dir., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., and James Lecky, Dir. of
Protected Res., Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., on “Endangered Species Act and GHG Emitting
Activities” 5–6 (Oct. 3, 2008). The EPA’s estimate was calculated using emissions numbers that
were 20 percent greater than those from their considered model facility. Id. n.4 Accordingly, I
have adjusted their reported maximum global mean temperature increase (.00035°C) downward
by 20 percent.
57. .00028°C / .0000013°C = approximately 215.
58. 1,500 MW / 215 species extinctions = 6.97 MW per species extinction.
59. This finding is in contrast to the EPA’s own opinion that a .00022°C – .00035°C increase
in temperature would be “extremely small” and therefore unlikely to impact any species. See
supra note 56 at 8 (“Given the very small global mean climate change magnitudes projected based
on the emissions of [a singular coal plant], we believe the outputs of such single-source impact
analysis for other species in other locations would also be of an extremely small magnitude that
is too small to physically measure or detect.”).
60. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, 2015 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 19 (2016)
(reporting that the U.S. has a hydropower installed capacity of 102,000 MW); American Wind
Energy Association, Wind Facts at a Glance, https://www.awea.org/wind-101/basics-of-windenergy/wind-facts-at-a-glance (last visited Jan. 16, 2021) (reporting that the U.S. has a wind
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coal usage,61 the operation of renewable facilities in the U.S. currently
prevents the future extinction of about 39,400 species62—and there is
room to grow dramatically.63 Meanwhile, the ESA lists (protects) 2,216
endangered and threatened plant and animal species globally, and only
58 species have ever been delisted due to recovery.64 The difference in
magnitude is illustrative—the entire ESA applies to fewer species than
we can expect a single large hydroelectric station to actually save from
extinction.65
Some clarifications about these data are important. This approach
has involved extrapolating a linear model based on available data and
assuming marginal effects along the curve.66 Such a model does not tell
operating capacity of 111,808 MW); OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY,
SOLAR
ENERGY
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES,
https://www.energy.gov/eere/solarpoweringamerica/solar-energy-united-states (last visited May
1, 2020) (reporting that the U.S. has a solar operating capacity of 62,500 MW). (102,000 MW +
111,808 MW + 62,500 MW) / 7 = 39,472.
61. The actual mechanisms of fossil fuel displacement are influenced by structural,
institutional, and behavioral factors. Richard York, Do alternative energy sources displace fossil
fuels? 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 441, 441 (2012); Andrew Jorgenson, Analysing fossil-fuel
displacement, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 398, 398 (2012). I assume barriers to displacement
can be overcome with sufficient public will. My analysis revolves around coal because not only is
it among the most polluting fuels and therefore a priority for phasing out as alternative energy
expands, but it also appears to be the most prone to displacement. See Jackson et al., Global
energy growth is outpacing decarbonization, 13 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 120401, 3 (2018) (noting
the elasticity of coal use).
62. This assumes for simplicity that these renewable energy sources have about zero
additional carbon costs that are not shared by fossil fuel energy sources. It is uncertain whether
there may be hidden and unique sources of GHGs in renewable energy sources, but if there are,
they appear to be relatively negligible. See generally supra note 56 (comparing energy sources and
carbon emissions).
63. See INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROSPECTS: UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, REMAP 2030 ANALYSIS 1 (2015) (noting that the U.S.’s renewable energy
share in total final energy consumption could cost-efficiently be scaled up from 7.5% to 27% by
2030 with current technologies).
64. U.S.
FISH
&
WILDLIFE
SERV.,
DELISTED
SPECIES,
https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/species-delisted (last visited May 1, 2020).
65. The hydroelectric dam I have in mind for this comparison is the Three Gorges Dam.
The largest hydroelectric facility in the world, it has an installed capacity of 22,500 MW which is
more than 3,200 times 7–though its actual energy output on any given day may be lower. See
generally UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THREE GORGES DAM: THE WORLD’S
LARGEST
HYDROELECTRIC
PLANT,
https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-scienceschool/science/three-gorges-dam-worlds-largest-hydroelectric-plant?qtscience_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects (last visited Jan. 16, 2021). Of course, while
not all facilities can produce nearly as much power as the Three Gorges Dam, the comparison is
still illustrative; in any case, larger, more productive facilities may yet be developed with
improving technologies and strengthened public will.
66. For further insight into the capabilities of these kinds of models, see Yi Yang, Two sides
of the same coin: consequential life cycle assessment based on the attributional framework, 127 J.
OF CLEANER PRODUCTION 274 (2016) (identifying

Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete)

8/23/2021 4:50 PM

390

[Vol. XXXI:379

DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM

us where the trigger points actually lie—in other words, we cannot be
sure that any particular 7 MW of coal will actually cause a species to go
extinct. In reality there are likely some discontinuities along the curve
of the model’s line.67 Similarly, given that there are a very large number
of species spread around the world, we cannot tell which would be the
next ones to be committed to extinction for any particular temperature
increase. This is why even minuscule temperature changes will be
responsible for extinctions—we are talking about the marginal effects
of changes in cumulative global emissions. For example, perhaps there
is a species that retreats up mountaintops to get away from warmer
weather; eventually they will hit the top where there is nowhere else to
go and then even a tiny change will wipe some out. Elsewhere and at a
different temperature point perhaps a river will dry up just a bit too
much or a tidal pool ecosystem will finally succumb to gradual erosion.
The causes of extinction may be difficult to ascertain directly, even
among observed species.68 In fact, most extinctions will go totally
unobserved by humanity.69 Still, extinctions are just as bad whether
they occur where we can see them or in nature’s many deep recesses.70
In sum, based on current models representing the best science
available, the impacts of climate change will cause historic levels of
species extinctions. While efforts to quantify these losses in terms of
individual energy facilities are imprecise and use some simplifying
assumptions,71 they show that extinctions driven by climate change will
67. It appears that most extinctions will be clustered near the top of the curve, since the rate
of extinction will accelerate as more ecosystems begin to collapse. Earlier renewable energy
projects may therefore have the most positive impact. See generally Ceballos, supra note 48.
68. See, e.g., Barry Sinervo et al., Erosion of Lizard Diversity by Climate Change and Altered
Thermal Niches, 328 SCIENCE 894 (2010) (demonstrating that extinctions of lizards are at odds
with direct observations but well-explained by data revealing drops in genetic diversity due to
climate change).
69. Extinctions will go unobserved whenever they occur among the millions of undiscovered
species. See Tracy Watson, 86 Percent of Earth’s Species Still Unknown?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/110824-earthsspecies-8-7-million-biology-planet-animals-science (discussing undiscovered species).
70. In fact, the extinction of rare, difficult-to-see species may be particularly pernicious.
Laura Dee et al., When Do Ecosystem Services Depend on Rare Species?, 34 TRENDS IN
ECOSYSTEM & ECOLOGY 746 (2019).
71. My approach has been to accept the EPA’s own estimates about temperature changes
from a representative coal plant. A more thorough empirical analysis, perhaps for use in litigation,
could start with the transient climate response to cumulative emissions. See generally Damon
Matthews et al., Focus on Cumulative Emissions, Global Carbon Budgets and the Implications for
Climate Mitigation Targets, 13 ENV’L RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (2018). Then the analysis could turn
to evaluating various representative fossil fuel and renewable facilities to determine a range of
likely impacts to global temperatures, sensitive to lifetime operation expectancies. Finally, the
analysis could more closely track species extinctions due to climate change for each marginal
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vastly outnumber species saved by the ESA, leading to a species clash.
When the ESA causes renewable energy facilities to be delayed,
downscaled, or outright prevented to help protect a species, the result
is the inevitable destruction of many more species. Does the ESA
really force such apparently self-defeating results? If it does, should it?
The rest of this paper explores the legal and normative dimensions of
a species clash under the ESA.
II.

THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND
RENEWABLE ENERGY

This Section describes the ESA, explains the scope of its
restrictions, details the impact on renewable energy projects, notes
possible exemptions, and describes caselaw that reveals an intractable
priority given to endangered species over most human interests.
The ESA, signed into law by President Nixon in 1973, imposes two
major restrictions—there may be no private or public takes of
endangered or threatened species, and federal agencies must consult
the FWS or NMFS to determine whether an action might jeopardize a
listed species or adversely modify their critical habitats.72 While these
restrictions often overlap, the two sections codifying them
involvedifferent processes and exemptions, visualized in Figure 1.

increase in various regional surface and ocean temperatures.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2018).
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No jeopardy

Avoid critical
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modification

Habitat
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Plan

"God Squad"
exemption

Incidental take
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Figure 1.

A. Section 9 “Take” Prohibition
Section 9 prohibits public and private actors alike from “taking”
species listed as endangered or threatened by the FWS or NMFS.73 To
“take” is defined in the statute as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect[.]”74 Agency regulation, upheld by
the Supreme Court, has interpreted “harm” broadly to include indirect
damage to species through significant environmental degradation.75
Habitat destruction that could drive endangered species to extinction
constitutes “harm” and therefore “taking” under the ESA.76
Section 9 has no de minimis exception—a take of even one
individual of a listed species is illegal.77 Instead, the ESA contemplates
a number of possible exemptions. Section 10(a)(1)(A) gives the FWS

73. Id. § 1358.
74. Id. § 1532.
75. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687 (1995)
(interpreting the word “harm” broadly in the ESA).
76. See Palila v. Hawai’i, 852 F.2d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that “take” was meant
to be defined in the broadest possible manner, including habitat modification); see also Env’t.
Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that
eliminating habitat of species can constitute “taking” that species).
77. See Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1793 (“[T]ake is determined at the lowest scale, on the basis
of impacts to individual species members, and once take is determined to be present it is illegal
to carry out the action without approval through incidental take authorization.”).
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discretion to permit exceptions to Section 9 restrictions “for scientific
purposes or to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected
species[.]” More frequently invoked is Section 10(a)(1)(B), under
which a private actor may take a small and defined number of
protected animals with an incidental take permit (“ITP”). Incidental
take “results in, but is not the purpose of, carrying out an otherwise
lawful activity.”78 Applying for an ITP triggers a rigorous approval
process requiring the submission of a habitat conservation plan
(“HCP”), a document that outlines impacts that will likely result from
the taking, what the applicant will do to minimize and mitigate such
impacts, adequate funding for mitigation measures, and alternatives
considered but not adopted.79
According to the FWS, “[t]he goal of an HCP is to fully offset the
impacts of take, and every HCP must minimize and mitigate the
impacts of take to the maximum extent practicable.”80 The FWS will
approve an HCP if the taking will be incidental, funding for the plan is
ensured, and the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of
the survival and recovery of the species. Since granting an ITP is a
federal action, it implicates other federal environmental laws, like the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and may require the
submission of an environmental impact statement.
Unfortunately, the HCP process and its requisite mitigation
measures can be extremely costly and cause substantial delays that
frustrate project development. For example, the Ivanpah solar facility
referenced in this paper’s introduction was delayed, significantly
downsized, and forced to pay millions of dollars towards conservation
efforts in order to receive an ITP—and even then, construction was
completely halted when it had encountered 49 tortoises instead of 38,
the number specified in the ITP.81 Litigation from conservation groups
ensued.82 The desert tortoise also struck back against the Calico Solar
Project, which was completely cancelled after litigation asserted that it

78. Glossary, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/midwest/endangered/glossary/index.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2015).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (2018).
80. See generally FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., CHAPTER 9: HCP CONSERVATION STRATEGY,
HCP HANDBOOK, https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/HCP_Handbook-Ch9.pdf
(last visited May 1, 2020).
81. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BIOLOGICAL OPINION ON
BRIGHTSOURCE ENERGY’S IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC GENERATING SYSTEM PROJECT (2011).
82. See generally W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
169097 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2012).
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would destroy 4,000 acres of tortoise habitat.83 The project’s primary
conservation strategy had been to relocate the animals, but
conservation groups argued that the tortoise survival rate was too
low.84 The solar company was eventually driven into bankruptcy.85
B. Section 7 Interagency Consultation Requirement
Section 7 imposes an additional requirement on federal agencies
to consult with the FWS using “the best scientific and commercial data
available” to ensure that they do not “jeopardize” the continued
existence of listed species or “adverse[ly] modi[fy]” a species’ “critical
habitat,”86 defined as specific areas essential for the conservation of the
species.87 Beyond the “no jeopardy” requirement aimed at species
survival, protection of critical habitat is designed to carve out territory
necessary for species recovery and eventual delisting.88
The consultation requirement kicks in automatically for actions
that could affect any listed species or critical habitat, such as renewable
energy projects involving public lands occupied by an endangered
species. If the action is likely to have an adverse effect, a formal
consultation is required, resulting in a “biological opinion” that
determines whether the action will jeopardize the species. If an adverse
modification of a habitat would not jeopardize the species but still
might result in incidental harm, the FWS issues an incidental take
statement establishing the terms and conditions under which take may
occur.
Even where a “no jeopardy” determination is issued, the Section
7 process can be burdensome enough to make projects cost prohibitive.
In fact, one empirical study suggests that the consultation process
disproportionately restricts renewable energy projects as compared to
oil, gas, and coal projects.89 Adding to the difficulty is the fact that the
83. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 1, 1, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Abbey,
No. 2:2012cv02586 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2012).
84. Id.
85. James Montgomery, K Road Gives Up on Calico Solar Project, RENEWABLE ENERGY
WORLD (July 1, 2013), https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/2013/07/01/k-road-gives-up-oncalico-solar-project/.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018).
87. Id. § 1532(5)(a).
88. See Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1069–72
(9th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing the goals of survival and recovery).
89. Melinda Taylor et al., Protecting Species or Hindering Energy Development? How the
Endangered Species Act Impacts Energy Projects on Western Public Lands, 46 ELR 10924 (“When
it applies, the [Section 7] consultation process appears to go quickly and smoothly for the vast
majority of oil and gas projects, for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, consultation on solar
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only exemption to Section 7 requires authorization from the
Endangered Species Committee, scarcely used but infamously known
as the “God Squad” for its power to permit action jeopardizing the
existence of a species.90 The Committee may grant an exemption only
if it finds, among other things, that the agency action has no reasonable
or prudent alternative, has benefits that clearly outweigh the benefits
of alternatives consistent with the rest of the ESA, and is of regional or
national significance.91 The bar for exemption is notoriously high.92
C. Single-Minded Focus on Species’ Interests
Not long after the ESA’s passage, the Supreme Court made clear
that the ESA does not weigh human interests in determining whether
a violation has occurred. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,93 the
Court enjoined construction and operation of a dam that was virtually
complete when an endangered species of snail darter fish was
discovered in nearby waters. Despite the fact that the dam would
provide electricity to at least 20,000 homes and Congress had continued
to fund the dam’s construction after passing the ESA and discovering
the snail darter, the Court reluctantly94 held “beyond doubt that
Congress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of
priorities[,] . . . whatever the cost[.]”95 Without a permit or “God
Squad” exemption, no amount of potential gains to humans enables
bypassing the ESA—the statute simply does not comprehend
arguments made in those terms.96 This fierce defense of species’
energy and wind energy projects tends to be lengthy and complicated. . . . This process has, on
occasion, led to substantial delays and/or major changes to [renewable energy] project location[s]
and footprint[s].”)
90. The Committee, created by amendment in 1978, has only rendered two final decisions:
one exemption for Grayrocks Dam in Wyoming, designed to provide power to eight states but
interfering with the whooping crane’s migration path, and one decision that was eventually
overturned. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534 (9th Cir.
1993).
91. 16 U.S.C § 1536(e)–(n).
92. See Jared des Rosiers, The Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act: How
the “God Squad” Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 858 (1991) (noting that the
“God Squad” exemption process is burdensome precisely because the bar for jeopardizing species
must be high to promote the ESA’s conservation efforts).
93. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
94. See id. at 172 (“It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number
of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require the permanent
halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 million. . .
. We conclude, however, that the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act require
precisely that result.”).
95. Id. at 174.
96. At the time Tennessee Valley Authority was decided, the “God Squad” exemption did
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interests has led to the ESA being known as the “pit bull” of
environmental laws—unyielding to the point of sometimes being
overbearing.97
What is less clear is whether the ESA permits any weighing of nonhuman species’ interests. Currently, in almost all cases, the ESA is
enforced absolutely in “green” contexts as well.98 There may be room
for some exceptions, however, in the case of a genuine “species
clash.”99 The next Section of this paper argues that the ESA can and
should be interpreted to allow sacrifices of members of endangered
species in order to protect and conserve many more species from going
extinct from climate change.
III.

HELPING RENEWABLE ENERGY PASS THROUGH
THE ESA

This Section considers what room there may be for renewable
energy projects to leverage their species-preserving benefits to secure
compliance with the ESA, whether through fast-tracking an ITP,
lowering an HCP’s mitigation requirements, or modifying the “take”
and “no jeopardy” prohibitions in some contexts. In other words, there
may be a “species pass” under the ESA that puts a thumb on the scale
in favor of renewable energy. First, this Section discusses the purpose
and policy of the ESA, especially as it applies to climate change;
second, it considers the ESA’s approach to harming members of
endangered species in order to protect that species; finally, it considers
inter-species tradeoffs. I conclude at each stage that renewable energy
projects may be legally favored under the ESA.
A. Spirit of the Law
The ESA expresses the “policy of Congress that all Federal
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species
and threatened species,”100 and was enacted “to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
not yet exist—the 1978 amendment creating the exemption was a direct response by Congress to
this ruling. See des Rosiers, supra note 92, at 826 (“[A] subsequent United States Supreme Court
decision in TVA v. Hill prompted Congress to add the process in 1978 and 1979 amendments to
section 7 [of the ESA].”).
97. Steven Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, ENV’T. F., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 55.
98. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 98 (“[One approach] is that green harms should be
prevented even at the cost of foregoing a green benefit. The [ESA] is the most prominent example
of this approach.”).
99. See infra Section III (for further discussion of this clash).
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1) (2018).
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threatened species depend may be conserved.”101 Conservation is
defined in the statute as “the use of all methods and procedures which
are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to
the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no
longer necessary[,]” followed by a long list of example procedures
including, “in the extraordinary case where population pressures
within a given ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved, . . . regulated
taking.”102 The spirit of the statute was important enough that Congress
twice explicitly provided that all federal agencies must conform their
actions to these purposes.103
One scholar suggests that “the ultimate measure of success or
failure of [the ESA] is whether the species that are the objects of the
act’s concern face a more or less secure future.”104 Because this
approach would artificially impose a binary between success and
failure, another scholar helpfully clarifies that “the more appropriate
measure is the number of species whose condition has stabilized or
improved as a result of ESA protection.”105 This is the simplest and
most compelling metric for the ESA because it gives appropriate
weight to the importance of biodiversity.106 Driven by testimony
emphasizing “the biological problem of extinction[,]”107 Congress
declared that “species of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to
the Nation and its people[.]”108 Maintaining diversity among species
101. Id. § 1531(b).
102. Id. § 1532(3).
103. See id. § 1531(c)(1) (“It is further declared to be the policy of Congress that all Federal
departments and agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species and threatened species and
shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act.”); id. § 1536(a)(1) (“All
other Federal agencies shall . . . utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of this Act
by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and threatened species[.]”).
104. Michael Bean, Looking Back Over the First Fifteen Years, in BALANCING ON THE BRINK
OF EXTINCTION: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 38 (Kathryn
A. Kohm ed., 1991).
105. William Irvin, The Endangered Species Act: Prospects for Reauthorization, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTY-SEVENTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL
RESOURCES CONFERENCE 644 (McCabe ed., 1992) (emphasis added). Note that under this view,
tradeoffs among endangered species would be not just permitted but required as a method for
maximizing the number of species whose condition would improve in the face of climate changedriven pressures.
106. See des Rosiers, supra note 92, at 827–34 (detailing the direct, indirect, aesthetic, and
moral benefits of biodiversity that drive the ESA).
107. Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Species Act of
1973, 51 N.D.L REV. 315, 321 (1974) (citing the legislative record, H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. REP. NO. 93-307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973)).
108. 16 U.S.C § 1531(a)(3).
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has numerous benefits, not just to humans109 but also (and especially)
within ecosystems—even rare species often play important roles in
maintaining complex and essential functionalities.110 Because the
delicate interactions between species are poorly understood,111 the
ESA is meant to offer protection that conserves species where possible.
As discussed at length above, climate change threatens species
conservation.112 Unfortunately, it does not seem that the federal
government in 1973 contemplated the eventual necessity of renewable
energy or the dangers of climate change.113 A search through the
legislative history of the Act reveals no mention of climate change;114
furthermore, many of the U.S.’s largest infrastructural projects had
already been put into place by the time the ESA was passed.115 It makes
sense that the statute would largely overlook how to resolve species
conflicts on such a large scale. As lawmakers began to realize the farreaching effects of climate change, the listing provision under the ESA
was broadly construed to include species that will be endangered or
extinct due to climate change in the foreseeable future.116 In fact, some
courts have demanded that wildlife agencies consider the impacts of
climate change in their ESA decision-making.117 In 2019 the FWS
under President Trump promulgated a regulation that appears to give
government officials more leeway in dismissing the impacts of climate
change on species as being outside of the “foreseeable future” for
listing purposes.118 Extinction from climate change is not an immediate
event but a process where a species moves from healthy to threatened,
to endangered, and finally to extinct. The fact that extinction is a
sequential process suggests that when Congress passed the ESA it
109. See generally TEEB, THE ECONOMICS OF ECOSYSTEMS AND DIVERSITY (2010); see also
Damian Carrington, What is Biodiversity and Why Does It Matter to Us?, THE GUARDIAN (Mar.
12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/12/what-is-biodiversity-and-why-does-itmatter-to-us.
110. Dee et al., supra note 70.
111. Id.
112. See supra Section I.
113. Robbins, supra note 33, at 560–61 (“Climate change mitigation and adaptation were not
foremost in the minds of the legislators who drafted the statute.”).
114. Id. at 584 n.19.
115. Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1774.
116. See Alaska Oil & Gas v. Pritzker, 840 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2016) (declining to invalidate
an NMFS listing of the bearded seal as threatened due to climate destruction that is expected to
occur in 2095).
117. See Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Kempthorne, 506 F. Supp. 2d 322 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(rejecting a biological opinion for failing to consider the impact of climate change on the delta
smelt).
118. 84 Fed. Reg. 45020, 45021–22 (2019).
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would have wanted to protect species from climate change. In any
case—setting aside listing concerns—the crucial question for this paper
is whether the statute permits harm to some endangered animals in
order to protect other endangered animals from going extinct from
climate change. The next two subsections consider this question.
B. Permits for Takes or Mitigation Measures That Help a Species
The ESA can permit the infliction of harm to members of an
endangered species in order to promote that species’ survival. Section
10(a)(1)(A) gives the FWS discretion to permit exceptions to Section
9 restrictions “to enhance the propagation or survival of the affected
species[.]”119 For example, while the ESA normally prohibits the
importation of trophies from the endangered black rhino, the FWS
sometimes permits trophy imports because a limited annual Namibiangovernment-sponsored hunt of male rhinos improves the overall
viability of the species.120
The ITP exception in Section 10(a)(1)(B) is also sometimes
granted in the spirit of enhancing a species’ survival. In 2002, a
Sacramento company sought permission to develop a commercial
resort on nearly 2,000 acres of agricultural land where members of 14
listed species resided.121 As part of its HCP, the company agreed to
purchase mitigation land off-site for a conservancy that would provide
a habitat that is better overall for the species.122 Even after accounting
for the members of the species that would be killed or displaced during
the commercial development, the FWS determined that the mitigation
measure would promote the species’ survival and therefore granted an
ITP, a decision that withstood scrutiny in federal court.123
The result is notable for renewable energy. The FWS or NMFS
may allow companies to interfere with individual members of a listed
species if either the harm itself or the subsequent mitigation measures
will ensure or promote that species’ survival.124 This presents an
opportunity to leverage the species-preserving effect of renewable
119. Id.
120. See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., BLACK RHINO IMPORT PERMITS FROM NAMIBIA,
https://www.fws.gov/international/permits/black-rhino-import-permit.html (detailing the FWS’s
rhino permits under the ESA) (last visited May 1, 2020).
121. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, 306 F. Supp. 2d 920, 929 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 926 (noting that “a habitat conservation plan need not demonstrate the survival
of individual members of a covered species. Rather, the successful plan must ensure the continued
viability of covered species, and the Service concluded that the [company’s plan] does just that.”).
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energy. If a species is threatened by climate change, then a renewable
energy project that reduces GHG emissions and therefore contributes
to the species’ survival may be framed in terms that the ESA
recognizes.
There are two upshots. First, in cases where the development of a
renewable energy project interferes with a listed species that is also
threatened by climate change, the FWS or NMFS may permit take
either with an ITP that gives weight to the facility’s reduction in GHG
emissions or under Section 10(a)(1)(A), which does not require the
lengthy and costly ITP application process.125 Second, the FWS and
NMFS may also consider offering a new mitigation measure to other
projects that interfere with species threatened by climate change—
investment in renewable energy. Rather than asking companies to buy
mitigation land in their HCP, the FWS might consider offering
“species-preservation credits” proportionate to one’s contribution to
renewable energy projects. The details of these regimes, e.g., whether
the credits should be tradable or under what circumstances a company
should be granted a 10(a)(1)(A) permit rather than an ITP, should be
explored further in the future.
This is a result we should expect and hope for. The ESA’s
protection of a species is counterproductive if it indirectly causes that
species to go extinct. The exceptions discussed in this subsection,
however, only apply to tradeoffs within a species. Many other
renewable energy projects may interfere with listed species that are not
themselves threatened by climate change. The next subsection
therefore considers the law surrounding inter-species tradeoffs to
determine whether renewable energy projects may harm members of
one species in order to save others from extinction.
C. Inter-Species Tradeoffs
A handful of cases in environmental law have considered animal
species interactions. Most involve managing one non-threatened
125. It is possible that in rare cases a species may be so threatened by removals today that
they will not survive long enough to reap the benefits of reduced GHGs over the coming decades.
In such cases, it may also be true that the species’ position is so delicate that they are unlikely to
survive without significant GHG reductions. If so, then the harm resulting from adverse but
GHG-reducing activities today is unfortunately moot. In any case, the most plausible result from
the analysis thus far would be that agencies are permitted to use their discretion in either
direction: they may permissibly allow the GHG-reducing activity that harms the species in the
present, or they may seek alternative avenues to protect the species. But in the coming sections,
I argue that even a harm that causes a species to go extinct is permissible and even obligatory
under both law (Section III(0)) and morality (Section IV) if it prevents the extinctions of many
more species.

Hamilton Macros (Do Not Delete)

Spring 2021]

MODERNIZING CONSERVATIONISM

8/23/2021 4:50 PM

401

species to protect a threatened one.126 The Ninth Circuit has held that
maintenance of animals (e.g., grazing sheep) in the critical habitat of
endangered species constitutes a “taking” under the ESA if those
animals pose a threat to endangered species by their destruction of
natural habitat.127 Courts even permit killing members of one species
in order to protect another species. For example, the FWS kills
common barred owls to reduce ecological competition for the
endangered spotted owl, a practice upheld by the Ninth Circuit.128
Thus, among non-endangered species, or between non-endangered
species and endangered ones, tradeoffs are permitted, widely accepted,
and sometimes even required.
Only one case appears to directly consider tradeoffs between two
endangered species.129 In the Everglades of southern Florida, the Army
Corps of Engineers developed a series of levees, dams, and gates to
influence the water’s level and flow.130 Unfortunately, two types of
endangered birds living in the area each prefer different water levels,
forcing a difficult choice that will inevitably harm one or the other.131
In response to an ESA challenge that the chosen water level would
harm one of the endangered birds, the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the
FWS’s biological opinion that the choice was a temporary measure to
prioritize the more sensitive species while pursuing a plan that would
eventually benefit both.132 The FWS was therefore permitted to harm
one endangered species to protect another without falling afoul of the
ESA’s take prohibition and “no jeopardy” requirement.133
The caselaw considered in this section can be synthesized into a
single broad guiding principle: minimize species’ extinctions. A
narrower framing would suggest the principle that the needs of the

126. See FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., EXPERIMENTAL REMOVAL OF BARRED OWLS TO
BENEFIT THREATENED NORTHERN SPOTTED OWLS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT 461 (2013) (“It is not uncommon to manage one species to protect another species,
particularly when the species managed is common and the focus species is rare or endangered.”).
127. Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“The defendants’ action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat is a violation
of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by the activity.”).
128. See generally Friends of Animals v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 879 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
2018).
129. See generally Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir.
2009).
130. Id. at 1261.
131. Id. at 1263.
132. Id. at 1271.
133. Id. at 1275 (noting that the incidental take statement was sent back to the FWS for
revision for being too vague regarding the conditions triggering re-consultation).
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most sensitive species must come before the needs of the more
resilient, even where both are endangered. Renewable energy’s
species-preserving effect is consistent with both of these principles—
harming members of some endangered species may be a necessary
incidental harm to protect many other species sensitive to extinction
from climate change.
A “minimize extinctions” approach to the ESA reflects our
evolving understanding of ecology and the law. In 1992, the FWS,
contemplating how to manage endangered species tradeoffs, directed
each region “to use a multi-species, ecosystem approach to their listing
responsibilities under the ESA” to be more sensitive to species
interactions.134 In 1995, the National Resource Council expanded on
the FWS’s approach and released a report detailing conservation
conflicts between endangered species.135 It suggested two ecological
principles for evaluating such conflicts: first, “organisms are
components of networks in which they interact[;]” second, “species are
parts of spatial and temporal mosaics.”136 The “most important” lesson
is that “the resources, interactions, and constraints of endangered
species can originate in the mosaic in components other than the
current location of the listed entity.”137 Species conservation efforts
that view “each species as an entity by itself, with little or no attention
to the network of interactions,” are likely to fail.138 We should therefore
not simply consider direct or obvious interactions between species, like
those where one endangered species preys on another. We must
instead broaden our approach to species conservation to incorporate
systematic and potentially unobvious threats.
The development of climate change science in the 25 years since
that report represents an extraordinary deepening of our knowledge of
the “network of interactions” between species consistent with the
FWS’s multi-species, ecosystem approach. The causes and effects of
climate change may occur well outside the current location or time of
some species, but sensible ecological management demands
consideration of such “outside” influences. Thus, when considering
how to manage conservation of, e.g., the desert tortoise, the FWS must
134. Settlement Agreement, The Fund for Animals v. Lujan, Civ. No. 92-800 (December 15,
1992).
135. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC ISSUES IN THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT, SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT CHAPTER 6, CONSERVATION
CONFLICTS BETWEEN SPECIES (1995).
136. Id. at 111.
137. Id. at 112.
138. Id.
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be sensitive to the way its decisions affect other, potentially distant (in
space or in time) species, like those threatened by climate change.
The ESA has been criticized for approaching conservation in a
rigid, species-centric manner that is inconsistent with a modern,
network-based understanding of ecology.139 However, the text of the
ESA does not demand such an antiquated species-specific
implementation. Its language is, at worst, ambiguous and, at best,
demanding of a multi-species, ecosystem approach. The reason we see
a species-centric implementation is not the statute itself but the
perspectives of those responsible for its implementation.140
Professor J.B. Ruhl, the only author who has directly considered
the issue of species tradeoffs under the text of the ESA, asserts that the
ESA’s language requires species-specific analyses.141 He notes, adding
emphasis to certain words, that the Section 7 consultation requirement
states that agencies must determine whether an action is “likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of [critical] habitat of such species.”142 The phrase “such species” refers
to “any endangered species or threatened species,” which could either
mean the one species whose existence appears to be currently
jeopardized by the agency’s action (Professor Ruhl’s interpretation)
or, more simply, any endangered or threatened species (a multi-species
interpretation). Under the latter interpretation, an agency action that
may harm the desert tortoise (for example) demands a consultation
that is not limited to considering the effect of the action on the desert
tortoise but also on other endangered or threatened species. This
interpretation not only benefits from textual validity by giving meaning
to the phrases in question, but it also has the unique advantage of
simplicity by refusing to read additional words into the phrase that
would limit its scope.
Beyond textual arguments, the single-species ESA interpretation

139. See Gary Roemer & Robert Wayne, Conservation in Conflict: The Tale of Two
Endangered Species, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1251 (2003) (criticizing the ESA’s speciescentric implementation and calling for a move from single-species management to a proactive
ecosystem approach).
140. See generally TIM CLARK ET AL., ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE
LESSONS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS (1994) (arguing that many problems with the ESA come
from the perspectives of those responsible for implementing and administering it).
141. Ruhl, supra note 18.
142. Id. at 1790 n.106 (emphasis in original). The Section 9 “take” prohibition uses similar
language, prohibiting the take of “any endangered [or threatened] species listed pursuant to
[S]ection 4.” 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2018).
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collapses when facing endangered species tradeoffs, as seen in the case
of the Everglades.143 If the FWS had considered lowering the water
level, the single-species interpretation would only demand evaluating
the impact on the endangered bird that prefers high water. What about
the endangered bird that prefers the low water level? The singlespecies approach struggles to explain why and how the agency should
consider both birds.
One might respond that in this case the ESA demands total
inaction—changing the water level will harm one bird or the other,
each of which would violate the law. This approach quickly becomes
unworkable. Imagine a situation where a flood raises the water level to
be too high, even for the endangered bird that typically prefers high
water. Reducing the water level would be better for both species, but
to different degrees—the high-water-preferring bird benefits less from
each unit of water reduction compared to the low-water-preferring
bird. To what level should the water be reduced? The multi-species
approach readily supplies a framework for discovering an answer—
reduce the water to the level that balances the needs of both species,
attempting where possible to avoid jeopardizing either’s extinction.
The single-species approach, however, flounders. As soon as any
decrease in water level harms the high-water-preferring bird—even to
a miniscule degree—the FWS must stop, regardless of the potentially
extraordinary countervailing benefits that would accrue to the lowwater-preferring bird. In fact, if the two birds ecologically compete
(e.g., over the same food source), then any change in water from the
flood-state would harm the high-water-preferring bird by
disproportionately helping its competitor.144
In cases like this, the single-species interpretation of the ESA
harms both endangered species, contradicting the statute’s very
purpose. Besides, determinations of conservation policy should not be
held hostage by contingent circumstances like water levels. From the
point of view of species, it does not matter whether the cause of
extinction is natural or anthropogenic, and neither should it matter
whether circumstances, like water levels, are brought on by natural
flooding or environmental managers. Only the multi-species
interpretation of the ESA makes sense of this intuition by allowing

143. See generally Friends of Animals v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 879 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir.
2018).
144. Perhaps the high-water-preferring bird dislikes the flood-state but can barely survive,
while the low-water-preferring bird will be driven extinct. In this case, the high-water-preferring
bird wants its competitor to die so that it may ultimately have more access to food.
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environmental managers to make decisions that are best for as many
species as possible.
In addition to the proposed interpretation of the ESA, there is also
room to consider the species-preserving effect under the “God Squad”
exemption to the Section 7 “no jeopardy” requirement.145 The
Endangered Species Committee must consider whether the agency
action has no reasonable or prudent alternative, has benefits that
clearly outweigh the benefits of alternatives consistent with the rest of
the ESA, and is of regional or national significance.146 While the bar is
high, renewable energy and its species-preserving effect have benefits
that sometimes clearly outweigh the benefits of alternatives, and are of
national—indeed, global—significance. The only time the Committee
issued a valid exemption was to permit construction of a hydropower
dam that interfered with an endangered bird. The Committee may
have been further persuaded in that case, and in potential future cases,
by considering the benefits that would likely accrue to endangered
species.
In sum, contrary to the common assumption that the ESA permits
no weighing among “green” interests, the ESA’s Section 7 and 9
requirements may permit weighing among the interests of various
endangered species. A multi-species interpretation is consistent with
the ESA’s text and purpose, the FWS’s species-management practices,
caselaw, and the principles of modern ecology.147 There is also room
for the “God Squad” to weigh the benefits of renewable energy for
endangered species. The result for renewable energy is hopeful: if a
renewable energy project can demonstrate that its compliance with the
ESA with regard to one endangered species would actually endanger
and eliminate many other species due to climate change, then the ESA
gives the FWS deference to weigh those tradeoffs by loosening its
restrictions. The only remaining question is whether environmental
agencies should loosen restrictions for species preserving renewable
projects.148 This is the topic of the next section.

145. See supra note 90 (describing the exemption).
146. 16 U.S.C § 1536(e)–(n).
147. One limitation in the caselaw is that harming one species for the sake of another has not
yet seriously risked the harmed species’ extinction, and courts have not yet had to explicitly
consider an ultimatum where one species must go extinct in order to protect other species from
similar fates. Such conflicts “likely will increase, however, as more species are listed and as species
and their networks become better understood.” NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 135.
148. See supra Section I. Of course, asides from normative considerations, the EPA is also
tasked with using “the best scientific and commercial data available.” It must therefore at least
recognize such tradeoffs where they occur.
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IV.

NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF A SPECIES CLASH

The ESA is widely considered the prime example of a statute that
does not permit potential benefits to be weighed against known costs.149
It reflects some people’s intuitions that it would be wrong to knowingly
kill endangered species, no matter the potential gain. For example, one
commentator maintains that “[t]here are some environmental harms
that we do not—and should not—tolerate, even at the cost of gaining
a substantial environmental benefit.”150 Indeed, if one cares about
animal interests at all, it is difficult to stomach the thought of individual
tortoises being displaced from their homes or killed by human
activity.151 At the same time, however, it is also difficult to rationally
accept the thought of animals being displaced and killed on a mass
scale because of climate change that could have been avoided or
mitigated. This poses a normative dilemma that I have called a “species
clash”: when in conflict, should renewable energy projects that
substantially reduce GHGs be allowed to harm (or risk harming)
endangered species, on the grounds that such projects will likely save
many more species from extinction later? The answer to this question
is yes, even without accounting for the danger climate change poses to
humanity. Analyzing the normative dimension of the species clash is
crucial for well-intentioned environmentalists who have mixed feelings
about the permissibility of harming the desert tortoise. It will also be
useful for preparing oneself to advocate for renewable energy, whether
when litigating, policymaking, or generating public support.
A. Ethics
By knowingly inflicting harm on some members of endangered
species, the hope is that more species will be saved from extinction due
to climate change. The first issue implicated by the species clash, then,
is whether to prioritize the one or the many. The second issue is how
to weigh harms inflicted to species in the present versus harms in the
future.
149. Nagle, supra note 20, at 98.
150. Id.
151. Of course, some readers may not care about animal interests at all. That belief would
make this paper’s overall argument easier: if you do not care about animals, you should be in
favor of policies that allow us to harm animals in order to combat climate change that will
significantly harm humans. If, on the other hand, you do care about animals, this Section argues
that you should still be in favor of policies that allow us to harm some animals in order to combat
climate change that will harm many more animals.
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The first issue is a debate heavily recited, with consequentialists
on the one hand who believe that sacrificing a few to save many is not
just morally permitted, but morally obligatory,152 and deontologists on
the other who believe that valuable things should never be treated as a
mere means to an end but should instead always be respected as endsin-themselves.153 The conflict between the ESA and renewable energy
is very much like the classic trolley problem.154 A deadly force—here,
climate change—is hurtling towards billions of beings; the dilemma is
whether it is permissible to redirect the harm away from them and
towards a few—here, by building renewable energy facilities that may
harm some endangered species.
Even in the relatively modest five-to-one trolley problem setup
involving humans, the philosophical community widely accepts the
permissibility of sacrificing the few to save the many.155 This makes
sense: when harm is inevitable, it is generally better to minimize it.156
Yet the species clash differs from the trolley problem in three
important ways that push even further in favor of the consequentialist
position. First, moving the discussion from humans to animals and
plants makes tradeoffs more morally palatable. Most deontological
theories assert not only that people are intrinsically valuable, but also
that our intrinsic value is based on traits that are widely-regarded to be
unique to humans, like practical rationality, emotional sophistication,

152. See, e.g., AVENGERS: INFINITY WAR (Marvel Studios 2018) (“Thanos threatens half the
universe; one life cannot stand in the way of defeating him.”) (quoting the character Vision).
153. See, e.g., id. (“We don’t trade lives[.]”) (quoting the character Captain America). Note,
however, that Captain America, living with regret, may have later renounced his deontological
commitments. See AVENGERS: ENDGAME (Marvel Studios 2019) (“This is the fight of our lives,
and we are going to win—whatever it takes.”).
154. See generally Judith Thomson, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE L. J. 1395 (1985). The
trolley problem is a popular thought experiment in which a runaway trolley is hurtling towards
five innocent people, and the only way to save them would be to pull a lever switching the trolley
onto a track with one innocent person. See also Phillipa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the
Doctrine of the Double Effect, in VIRTUES AND VICES (1978) (providing one of the earliest
framings of the trolley problem).
155. See The PhilPapers Surveys, https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl (last visited May 1,
2020) (reporting that 66.1% of philosophy faculty and PhDs believe we ought to switch a runaway
deadly trolley away from five people towards one person and only 7.2% accept or lean towards
not switching). This survey demonstrates a rare degree of consensus for philosophers—out of 30
queried topics, the only things they are more likely to agree on are that things exist (non-skeptical
realism about the external world: 76.1%), God does not exist (atheism: 69.7%), science can be a
source of knowledge (scientific realism: 70.1%), and all bachelors are definitely unmarried (a
priori knowledge: 78.7%). Id.
156. See David Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, 100 ETHICS 586, 602 (“[P]ersons []
have a fundamental equality which dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of
others.”).
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or moral personhood.157 In order to object to sacrificing some animals
or plants to save more animals or plants, one would need to believe not
only that animals and plants are intrinsically (not just instrumentally)
valuable. but also that their intrinsic value supports a deontological
(not consequentialist) approach to environmental ethics.158 These are
controversial commitments that further weaken an already tenuous
deontological approach to the present problem.159
Second, by raising the stakes from a few individuals to hundreds
of thousands of species, each containing some large numbers of
individual animals or plants, the odds of sacrifice being morally
permissible soars. Absolutism is increasingly giving way to a more
moderate position where deontological commitments may be
permissibly violated when doing so prevents the occurrence of
sufficiently bad consequences.160 Even renowned deontologist Robert
Nozick’s commitments begin to waiver in the face of “catastrophic
moral horror”—an apt characterization of climate change by those who
value animal and plant interests.161
Third, the fact that climate change is anthropogenic supports the
consequentialist approach to environmental ethics. Anthropogenic
climate change collapses any morally relevant distinction between acts
and omissions in environmental policymaking—whereas an observer’s
decision declining to switch a trolley track might, to some
deontologists, be considered a morally blameless omission,162 our
decision declining to mitigate climate change is not. Humanity set this
157. See, e.g., IMMANUAL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (1788) (generally
arguing that deontological ethical commitments follow from humanity’s unique capacity for
practical reasoning). See also Lori Gruen, The Moral Status of Animals, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHIL. Sections 1–2 (Fall 2017) (exploring grounds for the moral consideration of animals and
their significance on animals’ moral claims).
158. See John Nolt, Nonanthropogenic Climate Ethics, 2 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 701, 703
(noting that policy recommendations rely both on value theories and ethical theories). For an
example of a popular and influential consequentialist position, see PETER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION (1975).
159. See Andrew Brennan & Yeuk-Sze Lo, Environmental Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHIL. Section 4 (Winter 2020) (summarizing contentious debates about environmental ethics,
including various weaknesses in environmental deontology).
160. See Tyler Cook, Deontologists Can Be Moderate, 52 J. VALUE INQUIRY 199, 199 (2017)
(stating that moderate or “threshold” deontology has become a popular alternative the traditional
hardline stance).
161. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 30 (1974) (“The question of whether
these side constraints are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid catastrophic
moral horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure might look like, is one I hope largely
to avoid.”).
162. See Fiona Woolard & Frances Howard-Snyder, Doing vs. Allowing Harm, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (2016) (exploring the moral relevance of acts and omissions).
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trolley in motion and caused its breaks to fail, so we cannot be
blameless by doing nothing at this juncture—we will be responsible
either for harming individuals like the desert tortoise today or for the
deaths thousands of species in the future. In other words, the relevant
question now is not whether to knowingly inflict harm on members of
species, but how to act given that we will knowingly harm species no
matter what. The appropriate answer is to act in a way that minimizes
harm done to species.
The second issue is how to consider tradeoffs made across
potentially large spans of time.163 The dominant view in philosophy is
that future interests ought to be weighed equally to present ones.164 The
consensus is even stronger among those contemplating the interests of
non-human species,165 despite what one legal scholar assumes.166 While
it is true that economists use discount rates to weigh monetary costs
and benefits that project into the future, this practice is inappropriate
when weighing non-economic harms, such as the extinctions of
species.167 It is, therefore, a relatively simple issue to determine
163. See generally Lukas Meyer, Intergenerational Justice, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL.
(2015) (examining ethical issues between generations of people).
164. See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 485 (1984) (“[In general,] we ought
to be equally concerned about the predictable effects of our acts whether these will occur in one,
or a hundred, or a thousand years. . . [S]ome of our acts have permanent effects. This would be
so, for instance, of the destruction of a species, or of much of our environment, or the
irreplaceable parts of our cultural heritage.”); Nolt, supra note 158, at 703 (“[M]any
intergenerational ethicists view the discounting of harms and benefits to future people as
unjustifiable discrimination.”); Dominic Roser, Intergenerational Ethics, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/explore/savingearth/intergenerational-ethics (last
accessed Mar. 22, 2021) (“Some critics claim that . . . the concerns of future generations have less
weight than those of the present. Nevertheless, despite those doubts, most ethicists consider the
morally appropriate relation to future generations to be a serious topic.”).
165. See Nolt, supra 158 at 707 (“[A]ll nonanthropocentric theories of which we are aware
would support this two-pronged long-term goal: to maintain or restore both biodiversity and
climate stability.”).
166. See Ruhl, supra 18, at 1793 (“The ethics of intergenerational policy choices, in this case
not between human generations but of our fellow species, seem inept at handling a tradeoff
between avoiding a large probability of dangerous losses to an imperiled species in the present
versus avoiding a low probability of catastrophic losses to the species in the distant future.”). Since
the interests of future species are as important as those of present species, policymakers need only
perform standard risk analyses to determine whether the expected value of an action is positive,
as though the stakeholders in question were all in the present. Since the harms of climate change
are so gargantuan and likely to occur, we can be confident that renewable energy projects tend to
have a positive expected value in terms of species preservation. See supra Section I. Note further
that the issue is not tradeoffs strictly within a species, but among species generally. See supra
Section III(C).
167. See Nolt, supra 158, at 703 (“[Economic] discounting can often be justified by the
dynamics of money (e.g., its tendency to yield return on investment). But in intergenerational
value theory, which deals with noneconomic harms (e.g., suffering or death) and benefits (e.g.,
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whether harming one species now is permitted to save many more
species later: how confident are we that our actions will actually save
more species? Because the species-preserving effect of renewable
energy projects is overwhelmingly positive, the answer will often be
very confident.168 Still, there may be cause to hesitate when making
such determinations as a matter of policy.169 Before we can evaluate
those concerns, it is important to carefully consider to what extent our
feelings about the matter are affected by our psychologies.
B. Psychology
We may still find ourselves and others reluctant to accept the idea
of sacrificing the desert tortoise. A basic understanding of the
psychology involved in a species clash will help not only keep us from
being steered astray from the correct normative result, but it will also
help when navigating reluctance from judges, juries, policymakers, and
voters.
A number of cognitive biases may be at play when evaluating the
intuitions surrounding individual members of species. The
“identifiable victim effect” is the well-studied, but powerful, tendency
to respond more strongly to a single identified individual at risk than
to a large group.170 One cause is the affect heuristic, a mental shortcut
that supplies quick answers to moral problems based on the way those
problems make us feel in the present.171 Imagining an individual
animal’s death in detail makes us feel bad and therefore makes us more
likely to overvalue the event when compared to discussing, in vague
terms, the death of species by climate change. This is especially likely
when the animal being considered is “charismatic” and “high profile”
rather than “obscure.”172 Indeed, a 1990 Department of Interior report
found that 50 percent of available recovery funds were spent on just
ten species, contrary to instructions from Congress that prohibit

happiness or health), all justifications for discounting are dubious[.]”).
168. See supra Section I. See also infra Section IV(C) (discussing how policymakers should
handle borderline cases).
169. See infra Section IV(C) (discussing policy concerns).
170. See generally D. Small et al., Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of Deliberative
Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
& HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143 (2007) (explaining how humans relate more strongly to the
individual, rather than a large group (or some other explanatory parenthetical)).
171. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (discussing
mental heuristics and biases).
172. TIM CLARK ET AL., ENDANGERED SPECIES RECOVERY: FINDING THE LESSONS,
IMPROVING THE PROCESS 11 (1994).
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considering taxonomic classification in prioritizing recovery plans.173
This is a classic symptom of scope insensitivity, our psychological
inability to “feel” the badness of outcomes as scaling up with the
number of deaths involved.174 In fact, psychological research
demonstrates “mass numbing”—a person’s willingness to pay to save
other people from some risk actually tends to decrease as the number
of people at risk grows beyond ten or so.175 This same phenomenon has
been shown to apply in environmental contexts when valuing animal
lives,176 so it is not hard to imagine it influencing one’s willingness to
sacrifice for the sake of preventing climate change.
Biases do not just affect our moral reasoning—they also can
distort our predictions of the future. For example, the availability
heuristic is our tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with
greater “availability” in memory, which can be influenced by how
unusual or emotionally charged they may be or how recently we have
experienced them.177 We may overestimate the likelihood of a solar
facility harming a desert tortoise based on the tortoise’s peculiar
circumstances, appearance, or familiarity while we underestimate the
likelihood of extinctions from climate change because we do not “see”
them happening around us. These are considerations that must be kept
in mind when we find ourselves viscerally hesitant to accept the
sacrifice of some members of species in the present for the sake of
many more species in the future.
173. C. Griffin & T.W. French, Protection of Threatened and Endangered Species and Their
Habitats by State Regulations: The Massachusetts Initiative, in TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTYSEVENTH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE (R. McCabe
ed. 1992).
174. One compelling explanation for scope insensitivity is given by Eliezer Yudkowski,
Cognitive Biases Potentially Affecting Judgment of Global Risks at 16, in GLOBAL
CATASTROPHIC RISKS (Nick Bostrom & Milan irokvi eds., 2008) (“Human emotions take place
within an analog brain. The human brain cannot release enough neurotransmitters to feel
emotion a thousand times as strong as the grief of one funeral. A prospective risk going from
10,000,000 deaths to 100,000,000 deaths does not multiply by ten the strength of our determination
to stop it. It adds one more zero on paper for our eyes to glaze over[.]”).
175. Paul Slovic, “If I Look at the Mass I Will Never Act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide, 2
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 79 (2007); see Paul Slovic et al., Psychic Numbing and Mass
Atrocity, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY 126 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013) (finding
that people are most willing to pay to save groups of around ten people, but that they become less
willing to pay to save larger groups of people than they are willing to pay to save one or two
individuals).
176. See E. Markowitz et al., Compassion Fade and the Challenge of Environmental
Conservation, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 397 (2013) (finding that across several studies,
“compassion shown towards animals in need of aid decreased as the number of victims increased,
identifiability of the victims decreased and the proportion of animals helped shrank”).
177. KAHNEMAN, supra note 171.
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C. Policy
Even if one accepts that we should be ethically willing to sacrifice
a species now for the sake of a species later, one might think that
enshrining this approach in policy is risky or counterproductive. I
consider and ultimately reject reasons for holding that view.
The ESA is in most cases a useful statute. Prohibitions against
harming endangered species usefully prevent the rampant or arbitrary
destruction of such species. In the present, one function of the ESA is
to steer all project development—renewable energy-related or not—
away from sites where there are endangered animals. Additionally, the
ESA has a technology-forcing effect—since the costs of harming
endangered species are high, companies are incentivized to invest in
less invasive technologies and methods.178 The ESA is thus useful for
protecting species from projects that do not have a species-preserving
effect, such as fossil fuel projects. But as it is currently enforced, the
ESA is not fine-grained enough to filter out the bad from the good. In
a hypothetical world where the threat of climate change was less dire
or where the costs of ESA compliance were lower, it would be noble
to insist on siting renewable energy projects elsewhere and on stringent
mitigation measures. But in our world, the pressure on renewable
energy projects is unjustifiably excessive and self-defeating.
To secure the interests of endangered species in the present,
Congress could instead create positive incentives for renewable energy
projects that site away from endangered species or adopt mitigation
measures. The ESA currently only functions as a negative incentive
that imposes costs and barriers to projects that may impose harm on
endangered species. By switching to a positive incentive structure for
renewable energy (e.g., a large monetary award for renewable energy
projects that site away from endangered species or adopt mitigation
technologies), the destruction of species for mere convenience would
have considerable opportunity costs that would steer firms away from
harming endangered species where feasible. A positive incentive
structure would better recognize the need to rapidly develop
renewable energy.
Some commentators argue against an exceptional treatment of
renewable energy compared to other projects under the ESA, claiming
that a double standard undermines the legitimacy of environmental

178. See Robbins, supra note 33 (mentioning, among other things, the development of wind
turbines that are encased in a shell to prevent harms to birds/bats).
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law.179 A double standard “implies that two things which are the same
are measured by different standards.”180 By contrast, recognizing a
species-preserving effect under the ESA measures two different things
(projects that help species and those that hurt them) by a singular
standard (their effects on species). Giving weight to species
preservation is no more a double standard than is a carbon tax, which
imposes higher fees on actors that burn more fossil fuels. Furthermore,
not all double standards are bad—for example, progressive tax policies
are widely accepted even though they set different marginal tax rates
on taxpayers with different levels of income. Giving a project more
favorable treatment for its species-preserving effect is normatively
justified and likely to promote, rather than undermine, environmental
law’s legitimacy by maximally protecting environmental interests.
Other commentators worry about line-drawing.181 It may be
difficult to avoid the misapplication of a “species pass” to projects that
actually have no species-preserving effect. For example, a renewable
energy project that requires a substantial amount of GHGs to be
produced in its construction but that would only produce a small
amount of clean energy might have no species-preserving effect and
therefore not be the appropriate beneficiary of a species pass. Further,
a fossil fuel power plant using advanced emissions control technologies
might assert that the adoption of clean technology is species-preserving
relative to other fossil fuel power plants. Distinguishing when and how
to offer favorable treatment under the ESA will need to be laid out in
detail once the practice becomes more widespread, but the challenge
is far from insurmountable. After all, a project’s species-preserving
effect is an empirical issue that can be predicted on the basis of the best
data available. And we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the
good—the risk that a few marginally harmful projects slip through is of
relatively little consequence if the policy results in an enormous influx
of clean, species-preserving energy.
There will be no perfect outcome. Our decisions about climate
change will be felt by generations of both humans and animal species.
We owe it to all of them to make necessary sacrifices and take
179. See Nagle, supra note 20 (“[T]he special treatment that wind and solar energy facilities
have received [is taken as] evidence that environmental law is only employed against disfavored
parties[.] . . . Such rule of law concerns counsel against allowing only green benefits to trump
green harms, for they undermine the legitimacy of the law’s efforts to prevent those green
harms.”).
180. MARGARET EICHLER, THE DOUBLE STANDARD: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF FEMINIST
SOCIAL SCIENCE 15 (1980).
181. See, e.g., Ruhl, supra note 18, at 1792–93.
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calculated risks. Tragically, some of these may involve the loss of
species today, such as individual Mojave desert tortoises. Our solace
must be that posterity will be ever grateful for the multitude of species
that will live on as a result.
CONCLUSION
Environmentalists are understandably confounded by the conflict
posed between endangered species and renewable energy projects.
Although it is preferable to save as many species as possible and
although renewable energy projects have a species-preserving effect,
the ESA currently stands in the way of renewable energy projects that
have a powerful species-preserving effect. This paper has articulated
an interpretation of the ESA that would resolve this apparent
contradiction and yield a more sensible approach to both climate
change and the protection of species by framing both the ESA and
renewable energy in terms of species preservation. The term “species,”
to which the ESA applies, includes those which will be affected by
climate change; as a result, agencies should consider tradeoffs between
species sited near potential renewable energy projects and those who
will be driven extinct without the construction of that project. The
species-preserving effect is also relevant under the Section 7 “God
Squad” exemption and Section 9 mitigation measures. At all times, the
goal of agencies enforcing the ESA must be the same as it always has
been: minimizing species extinctions and maximizing biodiversity.
The broader theme of this paper has been that climate change has
dire consequences even for nonhumans. Taking these risks seriously
suggests that there is a need to radically change our approaches to
weighing costs and benefits in conservationist policymaking. There is
no costless solution to climate change; yet determinations that there
are any costs whatsoever currently preclude actions which are
necessary to unlock the overwhelming benefits of climate change
mitigation. Our methods of protecting species must evolve as our
impact on their ecosystems intensifies.

